Time Provider Persistence Registry

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Description

This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin.

• Type: TTP
• Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
• Datamodel: Endpoint
• Last Updated: 2023-04-27
• Author: Steven Dick, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
• ID: 5ba382c4-2105-11ec-8d8f-acde48001122

Annotations

ATT&CK

ATT&CK

ID	Technique	Tactic
T1547.003	Time Providers	Persistence, Privilege Escalation

T1547

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Kill Chain Phase

• Installation
• Exploitation

NIST

• DE.CM

CIS20

• CIS 10

CVE

Search

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders*") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

• security_content_ctime
• security_content_summariesonly

time_provider_persistence_registry_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required fields

List of fields required to use this analytic.

• _time
• Registry.dest
• Registry.registry_value_name
• Registry.registry_key_name
• Registry.registry_path
• Registry.registry_value_data
• Registry.process_guid

How To Implement

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the offical Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709

Known False Positives

unknown

Associated Analytic Story

• Hermetic Wiper
• Windows Privilege Escalation
• Windows Persistence Techniques
• Windows Registry Abuse
• Data Destruction

RBA

Risk Score	Impact	Confidence	Message
80.0	80	100	modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$

The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

Reference

• https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/22/persistence-time-providers/
• https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

source | version: 4