Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path
Description
Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2023-03-02
- Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
- ID: 62732736-6250-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
Annotations
ATT&CK
Kill Chain Phase
- Exploitation
NIST
- DE.CM
CIS20
- CIS 10
CVE
Search
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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*", "*\\programdata\\*","*\\windows\\temp\\*") NOT (Processes.process IN ("*.dll*", "*.ax*", "*.ocx*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
How To Implement
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes
node of the Endpoint
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues.
Associated Analytic Story
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
35.0 | 70 | 50 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to evade detection by using a non-standard file extension. |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5
- https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 3