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Description

The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Registry SIP Provider. It identifies this behavior by monitoring Sysmon Event ID 7, which logs registry modification events. The analytic specifically looks for changes in registry paths and values associated with Cryptography Providers and OID Encoding Types. This behavior is worth identifying as it may indicate an attempt to subvert trust controls, a technique often used by adversaries to bypass security measures and maintain persistence in an environment. If a true positive is found, it suggests an attacker is trying to manipulate the system's cryptographic functions, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data theft, or other damaging outcomes. Upon triage, review the registry paths and values modified, and look for concurrent processes to identify the attack source. Review the path of the SIP being added. This approach helps analysts detect potential threats earlier and mitigate the risks.

  • Type: TTP
  • Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
  • Datamodel: Endpoint
  • Last Updated: 2023-10-10
  • Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
  • ID: 3b4e18cb-497f-4073-85ad-1ada7c2107ab

Annotations

ATT&CK

ATT&CK

ID Technique Tactic
T1553.003 SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Defense Evasion
Kill Chain Phase
  • Exploitation
NIST
  • DE.CM
CIS20
  • CIS 10
CVE 


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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType*") Registry.registry_value_name IN ("Dll","$DLL") by Registry.dest , Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.registry_value_data 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `windows_registry_sip_provider_modification_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

:information_source: windows_registry_sip_provider_modification_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required fields

List of fields required to use this analytic.

  • Registry.dest
  • Registry.user
  • Registry.registry_value_name
  • Registry.registry_value_data

How To Implement

To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint datamodel in the Registry node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.

Known False Positives

Be aware of potential false positives - legitimate applications may cause benign activities to be flagged.

Associated Analytic Story

RBA

Risk Score Impact Confidence Message
64.0 80 80 Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification detected on $dest$.

:information_source: The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

Reference

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

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